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This paper examines the relationship between specialization and happiness in marriage in the 
U.S. and Japan.  Our findings, based on the General Social Surveys in the U.S. and Japan, 
indicate both similarities and differences in the determinants of marital happiness in the two 
countries.  In the U.S., the findings are mixed.  Women’s reported marital happiness in the 
U.S. is more likely to follow the predictions of the bargaining model where their happiness is 
determined by their own income.  Men’s marital happiness in the U.S. follows the predictions 
of the specialization model; they are happier if their wives are not working or, alternatively, if 
they are financially dependent on their wives.  In Japan, we find support for the specialization 
model, particularly in the case of women; they are happier if they are specialized in the 
household and they have a higher household income.  Our research highlights how marital 
quality is affected by the institutional context and the normative environment. 
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1. Introduction 
  The pursuit of happiness is one of the fundamental assumptions underlying the 
analysis of human behavior.  And yet, it is only in recent years that scholars have become 
seriously engaged in “happiness science.”  The study of discovering what makes people 
happy is far from complete.  Western societies are now richer, and their standard of living is 
substantially better, but the people are no happier today than they were fifty years ago 
(Layard 2005).  The disconnect between economic well-being and subjective well-being has 
led to a renewed interest in investigating what makes some people happier than others.
1  
  The aim of this paper is to identify the determinants of marital happiness, as a 
component of general happiness, in the U.S. and Japan.  The economics of family literature 
predicts that specialization between the sexes increases the economic gains to marriage vis-à-
vis efficient household production.  However, specialization also increases interdependency 
between the spouses by offsetting the costs and benefits of marriage (Oppenheimer 1997).  
While the literature is rich in empirical evidence documenting the economic gains to 
specialization, we know little about how specialization affects happiness in marriage. 
  Continued concern regarding the stability of the institution of marriage and the 
increasing attention paid to the benefits of a healthy, satisfying marriage (Waite and 
Gallagher 2000), have made it increasingly important to understand the factors that determine 
happiness in marriage.
2  While scholars have been studying this question extensively for 
decades (see Glenn 1990; Hicks and Platt 1970; Spanier and Lewis 1980), prominent theories 
of marital quality are based on the case of U.S. marriages, and little attention has been paid to 
cross-national variation in the determinants of marital quality. 
  We hypothesize that happiness and well-being are associated with the social 
institutional context.  What makes people happy in one society may not be the same in 
another if we consider the possibility that individual behavior is guided by market and non-
market constraints specific to the institutional context.  With an attention to differences in the   3
normative environment shaping marital quality in these two countries, we examine how the 
importance of economic resources, dependency, and children vary.  Based on our empirical 
findings, we evaluate the explanatory power of existing models of marital quality, identifying 
models that have more salience in an international context. 
 
2. Background 
 Investigations  of  marital  quality draw on factors such as the presence of children 
(Twenge, Campbell, and Foster 2003), the duration of marriage (Vaillant and Vaillant 1993; 
VanLaningham, Johnson, and Amato 2001), and the economic characteristics of the family 
(e.g. Rogers 2004; Rogers and DeBoer 2001) in predicting marital happiness and divorce 
proneness.  Included in the category of economic characteristics are: men’s employment, 
income, and job characteristics (Amato and Rogers 1997; Fox and Chancey 1998); women’s 
employment, income, and job characteristics (Locksley 1980; Rogers 2004; Rogers and 
DeBoer 2001; Sayer and Bianchi 2000; Schoen et al 2002); and family income (Amato et al 
2003; White and Rogers 2000).   
  The economics of family literature predicts that specialization increases the gains to 
marriage vis-à-vis efficient household production (Becker 1991).  Compared to a system in 
which individuals invest in both market and household human capital, a gendered division of 
labor is more efficient in that individuals only invest in skills in which they have a 
comparative advantage.  The gendered division of labor leads to interdependency in 
marriage—each spouse dependent on the other for the labor in which he or she has not 
specialized.  The household benefits from the increased efficiency resulting from 
specialization. 
  The specialization model has clear implications regarding the incentives to marry (or 
not to marry) as well as the costs and benefits of marriage but is more ambiguous regarding   4
marital happiness.  Becker (1991) argues that without specialization the gains to marriage 
will decline but does not make an explicit connection between specialization and marital 
happiness.  Parsons (1942; Parsons and Bales 1955) comes closer in the sociological version 
of the specialization argument in claiming that, without specialization, status competition will 
arise between husband and wife.  While Parsons’ main interest was in the function of the 
family in the larger society and economy, implications of status competition for marital 
quality can be drawn.  Competition, as opposed to cooperation, between spouses is likely to 
lead to a decline in marital quality.  Synthesizing these specialization models, we can 
conclude that specialization results in both increased marital harmony and efficiency gains in 
the family. 
  Related to the specialization model is the independence hypothesis advanced in the 
family demography literature.  The hypothesis predicts that an increase in women’s market 
work increases the risk of marital disruption (see, e.g., Cherlin 1992; Preston and Richards 
1975).  To the extent that marital disruption is presumably rooted in poor marital quality, the 
implications of this hypothesis may be extended to the analysis of marital happiness (Brennan 
et al 2001), i.e., an increase in women’s socioeconomic position would either result in lower 
levels of marital happiness or would allow women in already unhappy marriages to exit the 
relationship.  In either scenario, if we accept that women’s employment is associated with 
marital disruption, the implication of the independence hypothesis is that an increase in 
women’s socioeconomic position will likely be associated with lower levels of marital 
happiness.  It should be noted that the independence hypothesis is actually the “wife’s” 
independence hypothesis (Ono 1998); it speaks specifically to the effect of the wife’s 
economic resources, but is less clear on the effect of the husband’s resources on marital 
quality.  In the case of Japan, falling marriage rates have been partially attributed to women’s 
increasing “independence” from men (Raymo and Iwasawa 2005).     5
  The “revised independence hypothesis” (Brennan et al 2001) maintains that an 
improvement in family income from any source will have a positive effect on marital quality 
because it improves the family’s overall quality of life and stability (Cherlin 1979; 
Oppenheimer 1997).  A wife’s earnings, however, have not only this positive income effect 
on marital quality but also an independence effect which may decrease marital stability as 
predicted by Becker (1991).     
  The role homophily perspective (Simpson and England 1981) claims that marital 
quality will be highest when men and women occupy similar structural positions.  Contrary to 
the predictions of the specialization model, spouses are able to communicate more effectively 
and serve as companions for one another when they share the breadwinning role in the family.  
Similarly, the equity perspective (Mueller, Parcel, and Pampel 1979) asserts that spouses are 
happiest when household tasks are divided equitably.  Although the role homophily 
perspective focuses primarily on the benefits of a shared world view and companionship 
derived from occupying similar roles and the equity perspective focuses on the benefits of 
sharing household responsibilities fairly, both point to similar roles for husband and wife as 
leading to greater marital quality. 
  The final model speaking specifically to the relationship between the economic 
characteristics of spouses and marital quality is the bargaining perspective (England and 
Farkas 1986; Presser 1994; Sorensen and McLanahan 1987; South and Spitze 1994).  
According to this model, individuals derive bargaining power in a marriage from economic 
resources.  Complete specialization (which assumes that one spouse is specialized in the 
household and therefore generates no income) creates an extreme form of dependency where 
one spouse has no bargaining power over the other.  The more bargaining power held by an 
individual, the more work they can get their spouse to do and the happier they will be.     6
  While these are the key models theorizing the relationship between the economic 
characteristics of husbands and wives and marital quality, other models speak to the 
remaining correlates of marital quality.  Notably, the lifecycle perspective theorizes how 
happiness in marriage is affected by the dynamics of changing family roles.  For example, the 
presence of children affects marriage by constraining parents’ time and money resources.
3   
The overall predicted effect of children on marital happiness is therefore negative, with 
younger children having a stronger negative effect, since they create more demands on 
parents’ resources than do older children. 
 
2.1 Empirical Tests of the Models of Marital Quality 
  Empirically, there is little evidence in the literature supporting a specialization 
model of marital quality.  Findings vary, however, depending on the measures of the 
economic characteristics of the spouses considered.  Several scholars have found no negative 
effect of wives’ employment on marital quality or stability (Locksley 1980; Schoen et al 
2002; Spitze 1988; White and Rogers 2000).  Similarly, Fendrich (1984) found no direct 
relationship between a woman’s employment status and her husband’s well-being.   
  When looking more specifically at the proportion of the family’s income contributed 
by the wife or the wife’s income in dollars, several scholars have found that more equal 
earnings by the husband and wife are related to a more equal sharing of tasks and greater 
marital quality (e.g. Hochschild 1989).  Similarly, Sayer and Bianchi conclude: “rather than 
destabilizing marriage, wives’ relative income may be a positive factor, part of the changing 
equation of interdependence between husbands and wives” (2000, 939).  These findings are 
contrary to the predictions of a specialization model and are consistent with a role homophily 
or equity perspective.  Rogers (2004), however, found that, when looking at the proportion of 
the family income contributed by the wife, the risk of divorce was greatest when wives’   7
contributions to the family budget are similar to their husband’s; Brines and Joyner (1999) 
also found that the risk of marital disruption increases as the proportion of income 
contributed by the wife increases.  Wilcox and Nock (2006) found that women’s marital 
quality in particular suffers when they are earning a majority of the family income; they did 
not, however, examine the interaction of household income and the proportion of income 
earned by the wife to test whether it is in lower-income households with breadwinner-wives 
that reported marital happiness is low.  Similarly, when looking at wives’ income in dollars, 
Rogers (2004) found some support for a specialization model with the risk of divorce 
increasing at greater levels of wives’ income.  This finding does not speak directly to the 
relationship between wives’ income and marital quality, however.  Looking specifically at 
wives’ dollar income and marital happiness, Rogers and DeBoer (2001) found that increases 
in women’s income are associated with marital happiness for women and have no impact on 
men’s marital happiness.  This finding does not support a specialization model and instead 
suggests that women are happier in marriage when they are earning more money, consistent 
with a bargaining perspective.  These studies highlight the lack of consensus in the literature 
regarding the relationship between wives’ income and marital happiness.   
  As for the remaining predictors of marital happiness, few studies have addressed the 
relationship between family income and marital quality and the evidence is mixed.  While 
some studies find a positive association between family income and marital happiness 
(Amato et al 2003), others find no association (Amato and Rogers 2001).  White and Rogers 
call for greater attention to family income in the marital quality literature, claiming that: 
“given evidence that income and employment are related to divorce and that perceived 
economic hardship predicts marital quality, it is difficult to accept weak and null effects of 
income on marital quality at face value” (2000, 1044).  Children, on the other hand, have a   8
consistently negative impact on marital happiness (Twenge et al 2003; VanLaningham et al 
2001), particularly for women. 
  Informed by the theories and empirical findings of this literature, we set out to 
examine marital quality in the U.S. and Japan.  We ask: how is marital happiness differently 
determined in the U.S. and Japan?  Which theories of marital quality receive the most support 
in these different institutional contexts?  In particular, how do the different norms, 
employment structures, and family structures in these two countries influence the relationship 
between the economic characteristics of spouses and marital quality? 
 
2.2 A Comparative Perspective: the U.S. and Japan 
  Earlier research on the correlates of marital happiness (as previously discussed) has 
focused on the U.S.  However, the extent to which these findings can be generalized or 
extrapolated outside of the U.S. is uncertain.  Some comparative work has addressed research 
questions related to marital happiness.  Westley (1998) compared levels of marital 
satisfaction in the U.S. and Japan, finding that respondents in the U.S. report higher levels of 
marital satisfaction than respondents in Japan.  Stack and Eshleman (1998) analyzed the 
relationship between marital status and happiness in 17 countries (including the U.S. and 
Japan), finding that the effect of marital status on happiness did not vary significantly 
between the U.S. and Japan.  Ono and Raymo (2006) examined the consequences of changes 
in marital satisfaction for women’s market and household work hours in Japan, testing the 
predictions of the human capital accumulation hypothesis.  Yamaguchi (2006) studied the 
relationship between work-family-balance and marital satisfaction among women in Japan.  
None of these studies speak to the correlates of marital happiness in a comparative 
framework, however, and this is the aim of our analysis.
4     9
  The determinants of marital quality may be specific to the society, and its set of 
social norms and institutional setup.  In particular, Japanese and American couples are likely 
to measure the success of their marriages according to different criteria.  While the 
relationship between a Japanese husband and wife has been described as “like air” in that it is 
vital for survival but its presence is not felt, Americans look to their spouses to fulfill 
emotional and companionship needs (Iwao, 1993).  Furthermore, dependency is a taken-for-
granted aspect of married life in Japan, whereas, in the U.S., dependency is often considered 
synonymous with powerlessness, giving it a negative connotation.  For these reasons, 
Western theories of marital happiness are unlikely to apply in the same way in Japan.
 
  Japan and the U.S. present ideal comparative cases for studying marital quality.  
While both are characterized as post-industrial economies, gender inequality is greater in 
Japan than in the U.S. by almost any measure (e.g. employment, wages, educational 
attainment, etc.), and Japan has lower divorce rates.  Mean age at first marriage is also 
considerably higher in Japan (Raymo and Iwasawa, 2005) and marriage rates are lower.
5  
These salient differences in gender and marriage in these two countries are linked to vast 
differences in the norms surrounding female labor force participation and the household 
division of labor, and the structure of employment and the family.
6   
  In Japan, identities as a wife and mother are central to cultural conceptions of adult 
femininity.  Ueno (2001, 215) cautions, however, that “‘Japanese femininity’ is a modern 
construct, and not at all traditional.”  In the aftermath of World War II, the Japanese 
government emphasized women’s role as mothers despite the new constitutional guarantee of 
gender equality and women’s increased work experience outside the home in the war 
industries.  Women returned to the home as housewives in the postwar period when Japan 
was experiencing rapid economic growth.  According to Ochiai (1997, 35), “in the postwar 
period, the state of being a housewife became so strongly normative that it was practically   10
synonymous with womanhood.”  From 1950 on, women’s labor force participation rate has 
fluctuated between 46 and 50 percent.
7   
  Japanese wives occupy special positions of power in the household because of their 
husbands’ disinterest in household management and, more specifically, their control of the 
family budget (Hayashi 1990; Iwao 1993; Lebra 1984; White 2002).  In most households, the 
husband hands over his paycheck to his wife and, in turn, receives a set spending allowance 
(Lebra 1984).  Kimura (2001) reports that in 61 percent of households, the husband transfers 
his entire salary to the wife.  According to the Prime Minister’s 1995 annual survey, over 
80% of Japanese respondents considered household finances and shopping to be women’s 
work (White 2002).  This control over the family finances distinguishes the household 
division of labor in Japan and the U.S.  According to Iwao (1993, 86), “although the battle for 
economic independence for women in the United States has been overt and often bitter, 
Japanese women have exercised great authority in this realm for a long time.”  In the U.S., 
there is some evidence of variation in money management strategies by marital history 
(Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003), by social class (Zelizer 1989), by wife’s employment 
status, and by race and ethnicity (Kenney 2006).  However, unlike Japanese women, U.S. 
women have traditionally not garnered domestic power from the management of household 
financial resources. 
  In addition to social norms supporting a gendered division of labor, employment 
policies in Japan work to discourage women from full-time labor force participation.  
Spouses benefit from tax deductions as long as their annual income is less than 1.35 million 
yen (Ministry of Finance 1999).  Since wives are typically secondary earners in the 
household, the tax system discourages married women from seeking full-time employment.
8  
Female workers are expected to quit their jobs after marriage or childbirth because most firms 
operate under a seniority system which rewards workers according to their tenure.  This   11
expectation results in a vicious cycle where women are excluded from the internal labor 
market.  Since female workers are associated with a higher risk of exit (to take on family 
responsibilities), employers hire women into non-career track (or secondary) positions 
consisting of menial, dead end jobs.  
  These normative expectations and the economic incentives in favor of household 
specialization are reflected in survey statistics which consistently show that Japanese women 
are more likely to support the gendered division of labor than are women in Western societies.  
For example, survey results from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1994) highlight these 
gender differences between the U.S. and Japan.  Women in Japan were significantly more 
likely to agree to the statement: “The husband should be the breadwinner, and the wife should 
stay at home” (56 percent in Japan versus 24 percent in the U.S.).  They were also more 
likely to agree that marriage is the ultimate form of happiness for women (79 percent in Japan 
versus 29 percent in the U.S.).  At the same time, Japanese women’s beliefs about the 
gendered division of labor are considerably more egalitarian than Japanese men’s.  Some 
have pointed to this gap as contributing to the increasing numbers of women postponing, and 
even foregoing, marriage (Sugihara and Katsurada, 2002). 
  Time use studies further document the extent of sex specialization in Japan.  In 2000, 
Japanese wives spent 29 hours per week on housework while husbands spent just three hours. 
Thirty percent of Japanese husbands did no housework at all (Rindfuss et al 2004).  In many 
cases, Japanese women’s normative responsibilities for caring for the home, family, and 
elderly relatives make labor force participation challenging.  According to Greenhalgh, in 
East Asia the “roots of women’s secondary status can be traced to the interaction of capitalist 
economic institutions and patriarchal family institutions” (1985, 265).  Perhaps for all of 
these reasons, Japanese women’s status is derived more from their husband’s status than their 
own work status (Ogasawara 1998).   12
  In the U.S., women’s withdrawal from the labor market in the postwar period 
represented an historical anomaly (Coontz 1992) sparked by increasing faith in U.S. 
institutions (Cherlin 1992) and a high standard of living vis-à-vis the previous generation 
(Easterlin 1987).  For women in working class racial and ethnic minority families, this 
specialization in the household in the 1950s did not occur.  According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, women’s labor force participation rate increased from 30% in 1950 to 61% in 2000.  
Although a smaller proportion of U.S. women than Japanese women were in the labor force 
in 1950, it is clear that over the second half of the 20
th century, women in the U.S. increased 
their labor force participation much more dramatically.  Today, women in the U.S. are 
considerably more likely to be in the labor force than their Japanese counterparts. 
  While the household division of labor is clearly gendered in the U.S., the sex 
segregation of household tasks is not as extreme as in Japan.  In their analysis of NSFH data, 
Bianchi et al (2000) estimated that in 1995, women in the U.S. were doing 1.8 times more 
housework than men, compared to six times more in 1965.   In other words, the gender gap in 
the performance of household tasks has been closing over the past half century.  With the 
prevalence of divorce in the U.S., women are more hesitant than their Japanese counterparts 
to embrace dependence on their husbands both financially and in terms of status. 
  Based on these differences in work and family in the U.S. and Japan, we expect to 
find significant differences in the determinants of marital quality.  We predict that while 
working could have a positive or negative effect on marital happiness for women in the U.S. 
depending on the theory (specialization versus role homophily or bargaining), it is likely to 
have a negative effect for women in Japan because of the normative and structural constraints 
on women’s employment.  Similarly, while the predicted effect of spouse’s income on U.S. 
women’s marital happiness varies by theory, Japanese women’s marital happiness should 
increase with greater levels of spousal income since Japanese women’s status is largely a   13
reflection of their husband’s status.  We also expect that Japanese women should express 
greater marital happiness when they are economically dependent on their husbands.  Women 
in the U.S., however, are not expected to have the same positive relationship between 
dependency and marital quality.  As for the men, we expect men in both countries to express 
greater marital happiness with higher levels of earned income and, in Japan in particular, 
lower levels of marital happiness with higher levels of spousal income.    
 
3. Data 
  We use data from the General Social Survey administered in the U.S. and Japan.  
The Japanese General Social Survey (hereafter JGSS) is the Japanese version of the U.S. 
General Social Survey (hereafter GSS)
9.  The JGSS therefore includes a wide range of survey 
questions that are directly comparable to the GSS.  For our analysis, we use the survey years 
2000, 2002 and 2004 for the GSS, and 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 for the JGSS.
10  For both 
countries, we restrict the sample to married person between the ages of 20 and 69.  We 
exclude respondents who are retired and who are currently students since one of our primary 
research interests is in the employment status and economic resources of husbands and wives.  
Retired couples are likely to negotiate power and dependence differently in their marriages 
than those with earned income. Students, while not currently earning income, are investing in 
their future earnings potential and are therefore distinct from others without earnings.  For 
these reasons, both groups are excluded to make the respondents in the sample population 
more comparable.  The starting sample size is 1,811 in the GSS and 6,740 in the JGSS. 
  The outcome variable of interest is marital happiness.  This variable records the 
response to the question: Taking things all together, how would you describe your marriage?  
In the GSS, marital happiness is recorded in three categories ranging from 1 = not too happy 
to 3 = very happy.  In the JGSS, it is coded in five categories.  Marital happiness is modeled   14
separately for Japan and the U.S.; this modeling strategy is preferred both for theoretical 
reasons (the correlates of marital happiness are likely to be different in the two countries) and 
methodological ones (in order to avoid the problems inherent in pooling responses to marital 
happiness indicators measured on different scales).  It is possible that the meaning of the 
measure of marital happiness could vary between the two countries but this is a challenge 
faced in any comparative research.  Given that the JGSS measures were created as 
comparative measures for the GSS ones, we feel confident that our measures of marital 
happiness reasonably capture the same construct in both contexts.   
  We use ordered logits in all regressions.
11  The standard errors are White-corrected 
for individual-specific heteroscedasticity.  Because we are primarily interested in examining 
the asymmetries between men and women, we estimate models separately for men and 
women throughout our analysis.  In all models estimated here, we control for age, age 
squared and survey year.
12  In the U.S., we also control for race (but these results are 
suppressed from the tables).  Because the range of the survey years used in our sample is 
relatively small, the survey year dummies are included only to control for fixed effects, and 
we do not make any substantial claims regarding changes over time. 
  Our explanatory variables include the following: education coded as years of 
schooling completed, employment status of respondent and employment status of spouse (0 = 
not working, 1 = working), dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent has any children, a 
self-reported measure of health, and income.  Although the causal relationship between health 
and marital quality is uncertain, we include health as a predictor in our analyses.
13  The 
coding procedures are documented in the Appendix. 
  A common caveat in the literature on marital happiness concerns selection effects 
(e.g. Glenn 1990; VanLaningham et al 2001).  Since measures of marital quality are only 
observed for currently married persons in these data, the sample excludes respondents who   15
were previously married but may have separated because they were unhappy in marriage.  In 
our analyses, we control for selection effects following the procedure outlined by Heckman 
(1979).  In the first stage selection equation, we used the covariates in the happiness equation 
plus an identifying (or exclusion) variable which strongly affects the probability of marriage 
but not necessarily happiness in marriage.  In order to maintain consistency between our 
analyses in the U.S. and in Japan, we searched for a variable that was available in both 
countries and in all survey years.  Our identifying variable is the type of dwelling that the 
respondent currently resides in.  This variable is coded 1 if the respondent lived in a detached 
family house, and 0 if s/he lived in other types of residences.  The intuition is that 
respondents who were previously married but currently separated are less likely to be living 
in a detached family dwelling (as opposed to, for example, an apartment).  The results of the 
probit selection equation are shown in Table A.1 of the Appendix.  In both countries, type of 
dwelling significantly affects selection into marriage, but has no effect on happiness in 
marriage.  We then manually constructed the inverse Mills ratio (λ), and estimated all models 
with its inclusion.  The λ term remains insignificant in most models.
14   
  The data available to test comparative models of marital happiness in the U.S. and 
Japan impose certain limitations on our analysis.  For example, panel data would be suitable 
for the study of marital happiness.
15  Panel data would allow us to examine the causal 
direction of the relationship between marital happiness and income.  Data from both spouses 
would also improve our understanding of how different factors shape the happiness of 
married individuals.  Multiple measures of marital happiness and measures of children’s age 
in both countries would strengthen our analyses.  We hope that in the future, such data will be 
available from both countries, making such an analysis possible.  Despite these limitations, 
we contend that this research provides an opportunity to consider how institutional policies 
and the gendered meaning of roles in the family influence the assessment of marital quality in   16
Japan and the U.S.  Future research with additional countries or including measures of family 
dynamics and specific policies cross-culturally will be able to evaluate the explanations for 
the comparative differences in marital happiness raised in this research. 
 
4. Analysis and Results 
  We begin by examining the relationship between specialization and happiness in 
marriage by estimating models separately for men and women, and by spouse’s employment 
status.  We then test the predictions of the bargaining, equity, and role homophily models by 
looking more closely at the relationship between marital happiness and income.  All models 
include a full set of controls, including age, age squared, and survey years.  In the U.S., we 
also control for race.  These effects remain roughly consistent across models, and are 
suppressed from the tables.  The column “M vs W” in Table 1 and hereafter indicates the 
significance of interaction effects between men and women.  These differences were 
calculated by including a full set of interactions with female and all other covariates. 
Table 1 shows the results for the U.S. sample consisting of (a) all married persons, 
(b) married and respondent working and (c) married and both spouses working.  The table 
highlights some asymmetries in the correlates of marital happiness between men and women 
in the U.S.  The results do indicate some similarities across the three samples examined here, 
however.  In all models, we find that the main effect of gender is not significant indicating 
that on average, men and women are equally happy in marriage.  This is consistent with 
recent studies of marital happiness which have failed to find evidence of “his” and “hers” 
marriages (e.g. Kurdek 2005; Waite and Gallagher 2000).  Health has a consistently positive 
effect for both men and women across all three samples. 
  In the full sample of married persons (column [a]), spouse’s employment and 
presence of children have negative effects on marital happiness.  Whether the respondent is   17
working or not does not have any effect on marital happiness.  Household income also has no 
effect, a finding which is consistent with the literature (e.g. Amato and Rogers 1997; White 
and Rogers 2000).  Separate results for men and women indicate that men are less happy if 
their wives are working, a finding which is consistent with a specialization model.  It is 
possible, however, that causality runs in the opposite direction and men who are in unhappy 
marriages have wives who choose to work outside the home.  The results also clearly show 
that women are less happy if they have children.  These results are similar for the sample of 
married and the respondent working (column [b]), and married and both spouses working 
(column [c]). 
  We find both similarities and differences in the Japanese sample (Table 2).  In all 
models, health has positive effects on marital happiness.  Children have negative effects on 
marital happiness, and this effect is stronger (or more negative) for working women.  While 
these patterns parallel the findings in the U.S., we observe stark differences in other areas.  
First, women are systematically less happy in marriage than are men.  This may be partly 
attributable to the greater burden of parenting among women as indicated by the negative 
effect of children.    Second, women with working husbands are happier, but women who 
work themselves are less happy (Table 2, column [a]).  This finding strongly supports the 
specialization model for women.  And third, in all models, higher household income is 
associated with greater happiness for both men and women. 
 
Table 2: Marital happiness in Japan (ordered logits) 
 
  In our final analysis, we examine how marital happiness is affected by different 
specifications of income to more directly test theories of bargaining, equity, and role 
homophily.  Because our primary interest is to examine the effect of economic resources on   18
marital quality, the current sample consists of respondents who were working at the time of 
the survey.  We include in our models measures of relative income, e.g. the ratio of income 
between spouses.  However, Oppenheimer (1997) cautions that using relative income alone 
may lead to ambiguous results, since it may not fully capture the independence effects at the 
extremes.
16  We therefore include measures of both absolute and relative income. 
  The results in Table 3 show that income affects marital happiness for both husbands 
and wives in the U.S., but in different ways.  Results for Panel (a) of Table 3 (which are 
identical to Table 1, column [b]) show that household income has no effect for both men and 
women.  In Panel (b), we find that own income has no effect for men, but has a large positive 
effect for women.
17  In Panel (c), we add spouse’s income specified in quintiles to examine 
nonlinearity effects.  The omitted (or reference) category of the quintiles consists of 
nonworking spouses.  The results further highlight the contrasting effects of income on 
husbands and wives.  For men, own income has no effect, but spouse’s income does.  For 
women, own income has a large positive effect, but spouse’s income does not. 
 
Table 3: Marital happiness as a function of income (ordered logits) 
 
  For men, spouse’s income has an overall negative effect on happiness.  These results 
support our earlier finding that men are less happy in marriage if their wives are working.  
However, Panel (c) also shows a pattern where happiness is lower in the lower quintiles of 
spouse’s income, but higher in the higher quintiles.
18  In the highest quintile, men’s happiness 
is not statistically different from those who are married to non-working wives.  The results 
thus indicate that men are less happy in marriage if their wives are working, but they are just 
as happy as the husbands of non-working wives if their working wives are earning a high 
income.   19
  We next examine how one’s own financial contribution to the household affects 
happiness in marriage (Table 3, Panels [d] and [e]).  For this analysis, we construct a measure 
of relative income, or dependency, which is the ratio of the respondent’s own income to 
household income (Y/YHH), where 0 < Y/YHH ≤ 1.
19  In the case of men, for example, higher 
values indicate greater dependency of wives on the husbands’ income.  In completely 
specialized households where the wives are not working, Y/YHH = 1 (since spouse’s income is 
zero), which is the condition of full dependency.  Following the empirical strategy described 
by Oppenheimer (1997) and others, we include both logged household income and 
dependency in our models in order to assess how dependency affects happiness in marriage at 
a given level of absolute household income.  Our results for men in the U.S. show that 
household income has no effect, but their greater contribution to the household income 
lowers their happiness.  Put another way, greater contribution to the household income by 
their wives increases their happiness, a point we elaborate below.  For women, neither 
(absolute) household income nor share of household income has any effect on marital 
happiness.  
  We have thus far shown that men in the U.S. are less happy in marriage if their 
wives are working.  But they are also happy as long as their wives make a substantial 
contribution to the household finances.  How much is a substantial contribution?  Using the 
estimated coefficients from our regressions, we can estimate the share of household income 
that makes men just as happy if their wives were not working.  The happiness equation 
underlying Panel (d) can be expressed as follows: 
 
 U  = β1S + β2YHH + β3Y/YHH  (1) 
   20
where S = 0 if the wives are not working, and S = 1 if the wives are working.  (Although not 
shown in Panel [d], β1 was estimated to be -.702 [p value < .01]).  Other covariates are 
suppressed from the equation.  Equation (1) can be rewritten: 
 
 U  = β2YHH + β3  if S = 0 (since Y/YHH = 1)  (1’) 
 U  = β1 + β2YHH + β3Y/YHH  if S = 1  (1’’) 
 
The difference in happiness between men with working wives and men with non-working 
wives is therefore: 
 
  ΔU = β1 + β3(Y/YHH – 1)    (2) 
 
By setting ΔU = 0, we can estimate the men’s share of household finance that would make 
them just as happy if their wives were not working, given by: 
 
  ΔU = 0  when  Y/YHH = 1 – β1/β3   (2’) 
 
Using the estimated coefficients from Panel (d), it can be shown that ΔU = 0 when 
Y/YHH = .287, i.e. when wife’s contribution to household finances exceeds (roughly) 70 
percent.  This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.  The horizontal axis shows the line ΔU = 
0, which corresponds to the level of men’s happiness if their wives are not working.  The 
upward sloping line shows how wives’ contribution to household finances affects men’s 
happiness in marriage.  The triangular region from 0 to 70 percent is below the line ΔU = 0, 
and is shown to be negative.  In other words, men whose working wives contribute less than 
70 percent to the household finances is less happy compared to men who are married to non-  21
working wives.  In contrast, the region from 70 to 100 percent lies above the line ΔU = 0, and 
is shown to be positive.  In order to compensate for the disutility of being married to working 
wives, men would require at least a 70 percent contribution to the household finances from 
their wives. 
  In Panel (e), we include a self-assessed measure of household income in comparison 
to other households.  Earlier literature on happiness has emphasized the importance of 
comparison income, where people evaluate their happiness and well-being in comparison to 
others (Clark and Oswald 1996).  The variable we use is a five category variable which was 
recorded in response to the GSS question: Compared with American families in general, 
would you say your family income is far below average, below average, average, above 
average, or far above average?  Results indicate that comparison income has no effect on 
marital happiness for men and women in the U.S. 
 
Figure 1:  The relationship between wife’s contribution to household finances 
 and men’s happiness in the U.S. 
 
  The effect of income on marital happiness in Japan deviates from the patterns 
observed in the U.S.  Household income has a significant effect on marital happiness for both 
men and women in Japan (Panel [a]).  Higher personal income is significantly associated with 
higher happiness for men (Panel [b]), but has no effect on women.  Spouse’s income has no 
effect on happiness for men, but has a positive effect for women (Panel [c]).  Women’s 
happiness in marriage is therefore related not to their own income, but to their husbands’ 
income.  The quintile categories show that women’s happiness increases as a function of 
husband’s income.   
  In Panel (d), our results show that absolute (household) income is a more important 
correlate of happiness in marriage than how much each spouse contributes to the household.    22
Dependency does not seem to matter for either men or women in Japan.  Japanese women are 
happier when their spouses are earning a higher income (Panel [c]), but their happiness is not 
influenced by the proportion of the household income earned by their spouse (Panel [d]).  For 
Japanese men, marital happiness is not related to dependency but rather to their own income 
and to the overall household income.  Surprisingly, it seems that there are striking similarities 
in the correlates of marital happiness for Japanese men and U.S. women.      
  In Panel (e), we include the exact same question from the GSS about comparison 
income which was also asked in the JGSS.  In the 2003 JGSS, about half of the respondents 
were not asked this question, so the variable is missing.  We construct a missing variable 
dummy to recover the loss in sample size.  In stark contrast to the U.S., comparison income 
significantly affects marital happiness for both men and women (as evaluated by the 
differences in the log-likelihood between Panels [a] and [e]).  These results suggest that in 
comparison to the U.S., happiness in Japanese households is determined more by their 
financial status relative to others. 
 
5. Discussion 
  In this examination of the determinants of marital quality, we find that most of the 
predictors of marital quality discussed in the literature matter in both the U.S and Japan but in 
different, and sometimes surprising, ways.  Our research underscores the importance of how 
marital quality is affected by the institutional context and the normative environment. 
  As expected, children are related to lower levels of marital happiness for women in 
both the U.S. and Japan.  This is consistent with the role strain or restriction of freedom 
explanation of declining marital quality in parenthood (Twenge et al 2003) because the 
negative effect is largely limited to women.  It seems possible that women in both countries 
may bear the primary burden of children, with their husbands showing little change in their   23
marital happiness with the presence of children.  In addition, health is significantly, positively 
associated with marital quality for both women and men in the U.S. and Japan. 
  U.S. women’s marital quality is less tied to their husband’s income than is Japanese 
women’s marital quality.  Women in the U.S. report higher levels of marital happiness when 
they are earning more themselves.  Dependency on one’s husband has no effect on marital 
happiness.  Men in the U.S. with wives who do not work outside the home and those with 
high-earning wives reported higher levels of happiness than men with lower-earning wives.  
Of course, given the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is also possible that in happier 
marriages, women feel freer to either be economically dependent on their husbands or to 
reject pressures to “do gender” by earning less than their husbands (e.g. see Ono and Raymo 
2006).  The findings for women show some support for the bargaining model since women 
with more resources have greater power to leave the marriage and therefore have greater 
bargaining power.  Men seem to embrace a specialization model in which they are either the 
sole breadwinner or the financially dependent spouse. 
  The indicators of economic characteristics included in our models for Japan are 
related to marital quality in expected ways for the most part.  Overall, Japanese women’s 
marital happiness closely approximates the predictions of a specialization model.  As we 
hypothesized, the findings suggest that women are happier in marriage if their husbands are 
working, but they are not working themselves.  Happiness is not related to their own income, 
but to their husband’s income and their overall household income.  These findings are 
consistent with the argument that Japanese women’s status is “reflected”; it is based primarily 
on their husband’s status rather than on their own work status (Ogasawara 1998).  Men’s 
reported marital happiness is correlated with own income, as we predicted. However, their 
marital happiness is not related to the employment status of wives, nor financial dependence 
on wives.  Our findings follow the prediction that, based on the normative environment   24
supporting a gendered division of labor in Japan, men’s marital happiness is more strongly 
related to their own income while women’s is tied to their husband’s.  
  These findings are surprising because the correlates of marital happiness are similar 
for Japanese men and for U.S. women.  Own income is related to marital happiness for 
Japanese men and for U.S. women.  Economic dependency on one’s spouse and spouse’s 
income is not related to the marital happiness of either of these groups.  The potential 
explanations for these findings differ for the two groups, however.  A specialization model 
for Japanese men and a bargaining model for U.S. women provide the best fit to the data.  A 
role homophily model does not seem to be supported for U.S. women since neither husband’s 
work status nor his income is significantly associated with working women’s marital 
happiness.   
  U.S. men and Japanese women also share some similarities.  For both groups, own 
income is not a significant correlate of marital happiness.  Both groups report greater marital 
happiness when they have higher-earning, rather than lower-earning, spouses.  However, U.S. 
men express greater marital happiness, overall, when they are married to women who do not 
work outside the home.  Among U.S. men with working wives, financial dependency is 
associated with greater marital happiness while financial dependency is not significantly 
related to marital happiness for Japanese women.  We interpret Japanese women’s responses 
as consistent with a specialization model in which women specialize in the domestic sphere 
and men in the market.  U.S. men, on the other hand, are polarized, with some men 
expressing marital happiness as the sole breadwinner and others reporting happiness while 
economically dependent on their wives.  This finding is consistent with previous research in 
the U.S. that found the lowest levels of marital stability in marriages in which both partners 
make equal economic contributions (e.g. Rogers 2004).  Research by Buss and colleagues 
(2001) further supports our results.  They found that over the past half century, men have   25
increased the importance they place on finding a mate with good financial prospects while, at 
the same time, decreasing the importance they place on finding a mate who is a good cook.  
Perhaps the economic foundation for a stable marriage is changing in the U.S. along with 
increasing female labor force participation rates over the last 50 years and the declining 
hegemony of the traditional division of labor. 
  These differences in the correlates of marital happiness for Japanese and U.S. 
women are likely attributable to the different norms, employment structures, and family 
structures in these two countries.  U.S. women are influenced by a social-institutional context 
in which divorce is common (making dependency on one’s spouse costly) and in which full-
time employment is normative for women.  Japanese women, however, are less likely to face 
divorce than their peers in the U.S. and live in a climate less supportive of women’s full-time 
employment (both in terms of economic and social sanctions) and of an egalitarian division 
of household labor.   
It is possible that the differences observed between Japanese women and women in 
the U.S. could also be partially determined by the different systems for managing household 
money in the two countries.  In Japan, where the wife controls the husband’s earnings, greater 
earnings by the husband translate into greater economic power for the wife.  Her own 
earnings, however, are often considered only for the purchase of extras and luxuries and 
therefore not as salient in shaping the family’s standard of living (Iwao, 1993).  In the U.S., 
on the other hand, where women typically do not exercise the same control over their 
husbands’ paychecks, husband’s income is less salient to a woman’s marital happiness vis-à-
vis her own earnings.  These comparative insights bring us closer to an understanding of the 
cross-cultural correlates of marital happiness.  Future research in other contexts marked by a 
gendered division of household labor, low risk of investment in marital-specific capital (i.e. 
low divorce rates) and alternative sources of marital power beyond breadwinning (i.e.   26
women’s control of the household budget) vis-à-vis the U.S. would further confirm that these 
elements of the social-institutional context matter in shaping marital happiness. 
  On the whole, while Japanese men and women seem to embrace marriages based on 
specialization, in the U.S., there are noticeable disparities in men and women’s perceptions of 
a good marriage.  We interpret our analyses as showing that U.S. women want to earn high 
incomes and contribute to the family financially while men are polarized with some men also 
wanting their wives to take financial responsibility for the family and others preferring to 
maintain the sole breadwinner role.   Perhaps this polarization among U.S. men is evidence of 
cultural lag, with some men holding onto a model of marriage that may not be efficient or 
practical in today’s society.  Future research will clarify whether U.S. men are simply lagging 
behind women in changing their evaluations of a “good” marriage or if men’s 
conceptualization of a good marriage is linked to other underlying factors, such as beliefs 
about the gendered division of labor.  




  In the GSS, health is a four-category self-reported measure of health ranging from 1 = poor to 4 = 
excellent.  Due to survey design, this measure is missing for approximately one-third of the sample because 
these respondents were not asked the question.  To salvage the loss in sample size, we code these respondents as 
health missing.  Further, the frequency distribution of the health variable showed that the response rate for 
“health = poor” was less than 5 percent of the entire sample.  Since “health = poor” is the lowest ordered 
category of health, designating this category as the baseline category resulted in cases where the model did not 
converge under certain specifications.  We therefore combined “health = poor” with “health = fair.”  The 
resulting health variable in the GSS is therefore coded:  1 = poor and fair (omitted category), 2 = good, 3 = 
excellent, 4 = missing. The JGSS also includes the health variable in response to the exact same question, but 
the response is recorded in five categories ranging from 1 = poor to 5 = excellent.  We did not construct a 
missing category because the question was asked to all respondents. 
  The GSS includes direct measures of respondent’s income and household income, but not spouse’s 
income.  We assume that spouse’s income is the difference between household income and respondent’s income 
as a close approximation.  In the JGSS, all three measures of income are available, but the proportion of missing 
cases was not negligible (15 percent for respondent’s income, 25 percent for spouse’s income, and 28 percent 
for household income).  Deletion of these missing cases from the survey sample may introduce systematic bias 
into the analysis since the missing income may not be missing at random (Little and Rubin 1987).  We therefore 
employed the following procedure to predict income, and imputed these measures in place of missing income in 
the JGSS. 
 
(1) Respondent’s income (Y). 
For each survey year, we estimate the following Mincer earnings equation separately for men (m) and women 
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1
ln ε β α  (A.2) 
 
where X is the set of control variables that include the following: Age, age squared, education, tenure, tenure 
squared, working time, working time squared, part-time employment dummy, firm size of establishment, and 
industry sector.  Equations A.1 and A.2 are estimated using OLS.  We then retain the coefficients α and β, and 
use these to predict  Y ˆ ln  if the respondent is working but Y is missing. 
 
(2) Spouse’s income (Ys) 
If Ys is missing, then we predict  s Y ˆ ln  by estimating the Mincer equation using the coefficients α and β derived 
from equations A.1 and A.2.  If the husband is working but his income is missing, then we predict  s Y ˆ ln  by 
using αm and βm, and if the wife is working but her income is missing, then we predict  s Y ˆ ln  by using αw and βw, 
 
(3) Household income (YHH) 
If YHH is missing, but both spouses are working, then we predict YHH as the sum of the incomes of both spouses.  
If income of either spouse is missing, then we substitute the missing income with the predicted income.  For 
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Table 1: Marital happiness in the U.S. (ordered logits) 
 
  (a) Married persons  (b) Married and working  (c) Married and both spouses working 
  Full  Men   Women   M  vs  W Full  Men   Women   M  vs  W Full  Men   Women   M  vs  W 
Female  -0.163            -0.151           -0.063          
  (0.110)            (0.123)           (0.131)          
Education  0.038   0.055   0.022     0.041   0.054   0.026     0.036   0.048   0.015    
  (0.021)   (0.029)   (0.034)     (0.025)   (0.031)  (0.044)     (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.045)    
Working  -0.088    0.254    -0.131                          
  (0.143)    (0.296)    (0.166)                          
Spouse  working  -0.342 *  -0.506 ** 0.014     -0.383 *  -0.499 ** 0.065                  
  (0.142)   (0.178)   (0.241)     (0.164)  (0.190)   (0.309)                
Children  -0.402 **  -0.174   -0.629 **   -0.536 ** -0.196  -0.953 ** *  -0.592 ** -0.325  -0.843 **  
  (0.145)   (0.210)   (0.207)     (0.171)   (0.223)  (0.274)     (0.187)  (0.257)  (0.281)    
Health 
a                                  
  Good  0.457  **  0.705  ** 0.206     0.777 ** 0.600 *  0.966 **   0.752 ** 0.555   0.858 *   
  (0.176)   (0.255)   (0.250)     (0.217)   (0.279)  (0.350)     (0.242)  (0.332)  (0.355)    
  Excellent  1.108  **  1.180  ** 1.079 **   1.412 ** 1.127 ** 1.869 **   1.482 ** 1.174 ** 1.820 **  
  (0.193)   (0.276)   (0.275)     (0.233)   (0.298)  (0.378)     (0.259)  (0.352)  (0.385)    
  Missing  0.375  *  0.155    0.565 *    0.554 *  0.094   1.161 ** *  0.589 *  0.024   1.071 ** * 
  (0.184)   (0.270)   (0.258)     (0.225)   (0.298)  (0.350)     (0.251)  (0.357)  (0.357)    
Log  HH  income  0.116   0.096   0.182     0.204   0.218   0.323     0.130   0.150   0.263    
  (0.145)   (0.211)   (0.203)     (0.181)   (0.231)  (0.296)     (0.202)  (0.274)  (0.310)    
λ  0.046   0.370   -0.091     -0.004   0.575   -0.376     -0.098   0.499   -0.371    
  (0.325)   (0.492)   (0.440)     (0.408)   (0.534)  (0.646)     (0.462)  (0.631)  (0.689)    
                                  
N  1,811     865   946  1,336  763  573  1,098  569  529     
Log-likelihood -1,348  -612  -717 -976 -538 -423 -816 -415 -391    
* p<.05 ** p<.01.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All models include controls for age, age squared, race, and survey year dummies.  Ordered logit cut-points are 
suppressed from the output. 
a Reference (or omitted) category is the combined category of poor health and fair health.   32 
 
Table 2: Marital happiness in Japan (ordered logits) 
 
  (a) Married persons  (b) Married and working  (c) Married and both spouses working 
  Full    Men   Women  M  vs  W Full    Men   Women  M  vs  W Full    Men   Women  M  vs  W 
Female  -0.324  **          -0.362 **          -0.269 **        
  (0.057)           (0.064)           (0.070)         
Education  0.032  **  0.033  * 0.033     0.033 * 0.031   0.042     0.050 ** 0.046 * 0.054 *   
 (0.011)    (0.016)    (0.017)     (0.013)   (0.016)  (0.023)     (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.025)    
Working  -0.160  *  0.094    -0.229 **                        
  (0.067)   (0.183)    (0.073)                          
Spouse  working  -0.013    -0.084   0.227 *  *  -0.043   -0.093  0.280                  
 (0.058)    (0.073)    (0.113)     (0.067)   (0.076)   (0.178)               
Children -0.292  **  -0.328  *  -0.284 *    -0.361 ** -0.257  -0.468 **   -0.519 ** -0.417 *  -0.531 **  
 (0.092)    (0.139)    (0.125)     (0.110)   (0.153)  (0.170)     (0.135)  (0.204)  (0.188)    
Health 
a                                  
  Fair  0.171    0.052    0.261     0.081   0.318   -0.177     0.096   0.373   -0.067    
 (0.166)    (0.248)    (0.229)     (0.207)   (0.285)  (0.311)     (0.277)  (0.463)  (0.339)    
    Average  0.293    -0.024   0.517 *    0.199  0.249  0.169     0.272  0.292  0.315    
 (0.157)    (0.236)    (0.218)     (0.196)   (0.273)  (0.293)     (0.264)  (0.448)  (0.322)    
  Good  0.887  **  0.621  ** 1.080 **   0.823 ** 0.889 **  0.778 **   0.882 ** 0.900 *  0.937 **  
 (0.159)    (0.239)    (0.220)     (0.198)   (0.276)  (0.296)     (0.266)  (0.450)  (0.324)    
  Excellent  1.535  **  1.257  ** 1.725 **   1.436 ** 1.514 **  1.349 **   1.516 ** 1.530 ** 1.534 **  
 (0.162)    (0.242)    (0.223)     (0.201)   (0.278)  (0.298)     (0.268)  (0.454)  (0.326)    
Log HH income  0.309  **  0.295  ** 0.317 **   0.391 ** 0.376 **  0.443 **   0.390 ** 0.447 ** 0.405 **  
 (0.064)    (0.101)    (0.085)     (0.077)   (0.109)  (0.117)     (0.100)  (0.154)  (0.136)    
λ  -0.240    -0.824   0.114     0.194  0.183  0.647     -0.418  0.539   -0.404    
 (0.352)    (0.645)    (0.430)     (0.414)   (0.799)  (0.530)     (0.711)  (1.492)  (0.826)    
                                   
N  6,740     2,947   3,793  4,899  2,750    2,149  3,461  1,522  1,939     
Log-likelihood -8,176    -3,397    -4,743    -5,892  -3,153  -2,709   -4,203  -1,768  -2,417    
* p<.05 ** p<.01.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All models include controls for age, age squared, and survey year dummies.  Ordered logit cut-points are 
suppressed from the output. 
a Reference (or omitted) category is poor health.   33
Table 3: Marital happiness as a function of income (ordered logits) 
   U.S. Japan 
    Men  Women M vs W Men Women    M vs W
(a) Log HH income (ln Y) 0.218  0.323 0.376** 0.443  ** 
   (0.231)  (0.296) (0.109) (0.117)   
  λ 0.575  -0.376 0.183 0.647   
   (0.534)  (0.646) (0.799) (0.530)   
 Log-likelihood -538  -423 -3,153 -2,709   
(b) Log R income (ln Y) -0.270 0.224* ** 0.241** 0.004    **
   (0.139)  (0.110) (0.073) (0.049)   
  λ -0.285  -0.654 -0.781 -0.946  ** 
   (0.396)  (0.398) (0.634) (0.349)   
 Log-likelihood -537  -421 -3,154 -2,715   
(c) Log R income (ln Y) -0.192 0.248* 0.252** 0.010    **
   (0.152)  (0.121) (0.073) (0.049)   
 Spouse  income       
  Quintile 1  -0.608 ** 0.278 -0.151 0.111  
   (0.226)  (0.767) (0.131) (0.203)   
  Quintile 2  -0.820 ** 0.809 -0.182 0.412 *  **
   (0.289)  (0.790) (0.117) (0.190)   
  Quintile 3  -0.518 * 0.529 -0.072 0.490 *  *
   (0.257)  (0.822) (0.126) (0.216)   
  Quintile 4  -0.574 * 0.606 0.067 0.471 * 
   (0.291)  (0.840) (0.141) (0.211)   
 Quintile  5  0.223  0.732 0.145 0.814  **  **
   (0.342)  (0.893) (0.115) (0.208)   
  λ 0.122  -0.314 -0.490 -0.467   
   (0.461)  (0.604) (0.645) (0.366)   
 Log-likelihood -532  -419 -3,150 -2,706   
(d) Log HH income  0.205  0.350 0.408** 0.443 ** 
   (0.232)  (0.295) (0.110) (0.118)   
  Share of HH income  -0.984 ** 0.592 ** 0.316 -0.152  
   =  Y / YHH   (0.377)  (0.444) (0.179) (0.208)  
  λ 0.634  -0.418 0.183 0.727   
   (0.533)  (0.641) (0.802) (0.543)   
 Log-likelihood -534  -422 -3,151 -2,709   
(e) Log HH income (YHH) 0.182  0.229 0.200 0.284  * 
   (0.239)  (0.312) (0.117) (0.123)   
 Relative  standing      
    Below average -0.051  -0.136 0.063 0.155   
   (0.570)  (0.592) (0.167) (0.188)   
    Average -0.070  -0.128 0.279 0.482  ** 
   (0.533)  (0.560) (0.166) (0.186)   
    Above average 0.130  0.156 0.451* 0.841  ** 
   (0.530)  (0.620) (0.195) (0.222)   
    Far above average -0.100 0.146 1.397** 0.618   
   (0.622)  (0.774) (0.423) (0.444)   
    Missing   0.650** 0.543  * 
     (0.216) (0.231)   
  λ 0.564  -0.461 -0.180 0.401     
   (0.549)  (0.656) (0.812) (0.537)    
 Log-likelihood -538  -422 -3,139 -2,696   
 * p<.05 ** p<.01.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All models include controls for variables 
included in Tables 1 and 2.  Cut-points are suppressed from the output.  Sample size for all models are:  U.S. 




Table A.1: Selection into marriage (probits) 
 
 U.S.    Japan 
         
Female -0.118  *    -0.263 ** 
 (0.054)      (0.069)  
Education -0.024  *   -0.027  
 (0.011)      (0.017)  
Working -0.416  **    -0.579 ** 
 (0.074)      (0.088)  
Children 0.069      0.463 ** 
 (0.072)      (0.090)  
Health 
a,b         
  Fair        0.358 * 
       (0.146)  
  Average        0.347 ** 
       (0.134)  
  Good  0.015      0.415 ** 
 (0.090)      (0.141)  
  Excellent  -0.022      0.223  
 (0.098)      (0.136)  
  Missing  -0.128        
 (0.094)        
Log HH income  0.631  **    0.798 ** 
 (0.048)      (0.049)  
Type of dwelling  0.674  **    0.517 ** 
 (0.056)      (0.069)  
         
N 2,995      7,159    
Log-likelihood -1,578      -966  
* p<.05 ** p<.01.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Both models include 
controls for age, age squared, and survey year dummies.  The U.S. model also 
includes controls for race. 
a In the U.S., the reference (or omitted) category is the combined category of poor 






Figure 1:  The relationship between wife’s contribution to household finances 
 and men’s happiness in the U.S.
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 For example, Kahneman and colleagues (2004) are developing a new estimation technique which will be used 
to calculate a “national well-being account,” a measure comparable to economic indicators such as the GDP. 
 
2 In the literature, several terms are often used interchangeably to represent the same concept: marital 
satisfaction, marital happiness, and marital quality.  According to Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976), a 
distinction exists in that “happiness” refers to an emotional state while “satisfaction” involves a cognitive 
judgment against some standard.  In this paper, we use the term “marital happiness” because the survey measure 
specifically asks about “happiness” and we consider marital happiness to be an indicator of marital quality. 
 
3 See VanLaningham et al (2001) for review of literature regarding the negative effect of children on marital 
happiness. 
 
4 Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) examine well-being over time in the U.S. and Britain.  However, they 
examine “general happiness” and not marital happiness.  Ono (2003) analyzes the determinants of marriage 
formation in the U.S., Japan, and Sweden with special attention to variations in the gender institutional context 
in the three countries.  Davis and Greenstein (2004) examine some of the theoretical models tested in the present 
study in a comparative framework but their outcome measure is the gendered division of household labor. 
 
5 According to the Statistics Bureau of Japan and the National Center for Health Statistics in the U.S., while the 
marriage rate was 7.5 (per 1000 population) in 2005 in the U.S., it was only 5.7 in Japan.   
 
6 See UNDP’s Human Development Reports for various years (http://hdr.undp.org) for recent measures of 
gender equality in U.S. and Japan.  The divorce rate in the U.S. has been considerably higher than in Japan, 
although this gap is closing.  In 1990, the divorce rate per 1000 persons was 7.2 in the U.S. versus 1.8 in Japan.  
In 2000, the corresponding figures were 6.2 in the U.S. versus 3.1 in Japan (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). 
 
7 Source: Statistical Survey Department, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 
Japan. 
 
8 See Ono and Rebick (2003) for a review of the barriers to women’s labor force participation in Japan. 
 
9 The JGSS are designed and carried out at the Institute of Regional Studies at Osaka University of Commerce 
in collaboration with the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo under the direction of Ichiro 
Tanioka, Michio Nitta, Hiroki Sato, and Noriko Iwai, with Project Manager, Minae Osawa. The project is 
supported financially by a Gakujutsu Frontier Grant from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology for the 1999-2003 academic years, and the datasets are compiled and distributed by the 
SSJ Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, the 
University of Tokyo. 
 
10 The GSS is only administered biannually, so the survey years 2001 and 2003 are not available.  The JGSS 
was launched in 2000.  The dataset for the year 2003 is the latest version of the JGSS that is publicly available.  
The response rates for the GSS were .700 in 2000, .701 in 2002, and .704 in 2004.  The response rates for the 
JGSS were .649 in 2000, .631 in 2001, .623 in 2002, and .550 in 2003. 
 
11 Ordered logit assumes proportional odds between response categories.  An alternative approach is to use 
generalized ordered logistic regression which does not impose this assumption.  Regression diagnostics and 
goodness-of-fit statistics indicated that generalized ordered logistic regression did not produce results that were 
significantly different from those estimated by ordered logit.  We also estimated another model where marital 
happiness is dichotomized.  Responses indicating the highest level of happiness were coded 1, and all other 
responses were coded 0.  The substantive interpretation of these models with dichotomous outcomes did not 
significantly differ from the models with categorical outcomes. 
 
12 We examined various specifications of age including age linear, age cubic, and cohort categories.  We used 
age quadratic here because this specification resulted in the best overall fit.   37
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13 For example, Booth and Johnson (1994) hypothesize that poor health may negatively impact marital 
happiness through its effect on everyday functioning, shared activities, the gendered division of labor, and the 
incidence of depression. 
 
14 It should be noted, however, that the absence of selection effects may be the result of model specification.  
We cannot fully rule out the possibility of selection effects from our models. 
 
15 To date, there is only one panel data available in Japan – the Japanese Panel Study of Consumers (JPSC) – but 
the JPSC sample is limited to women only.  See, for example, Nagai (2002), Ono and Raymo (2006) and 
Yamaguchi (2006) for research on (women’s) marital satisfaction using the JPSC data. 
 
16 For example, the ratio of wife’s income to husband’s income may be high because the husband’s earnings are 
low, or because the wife’s earnings are high (Oppenheimer 1997). 
 
17 We also conducted separate regressions using own income in quintiles, but the results were not significantly 
different from those reported in Panel (a) and are not shown here. 
 
18 A separate t-test of the coefficients showed that the coefficients for the two lowest quintiles were not 
statistically significant from each other, but the coefficients for quintiles 3 and quintiles 5 are. 
 
19 Sorensen and McLanahan (1987)’s measure of dependency is (Ys – Y) / (Ys + Y) or (Ys – Y) / YHH if we assume 
YHH = Ys + Y.  However, we avoided using this measure since Ys is missing in the GSS, and we wanted to 
minimize measurement errors associated with our indirect measure of Ys. 
 